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Introduction 
On July 17, 1998, the international community created the Rome Statute, the 
document outlining the creation of the ICC. The Rome Statute was ratified by 60 
countries by July 1, 2002, making the ICC a legitimate and operating institution (About 
the Court). The ICC is able to prosecute four categories of crime – genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression (Schabas 2011, 88) – for which it 
has temporal jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and territorial jurisdiction. Temporal 
jurisdiction limits the court to only considering crimes that occurred after the Rome 
Statute was ratified (Schabas 2011, 69). Personal jurisdiction allows the court to consider 
crimes where the accused is a national of a state party regardless of where the crimes 
occurred (Schabas 2011, 76). Finally, territorial jurisdiction empowers the ICC to 
exercise jurisdiction over crimes that occur within the territory of a state party to the ICC 
or where the United Nations Security Council gives jurisdiction to crimes occurring in a 
particular territory (Schabas 2011, 81). The ICC was created to end impunity for 
international criminals, and to subsequently stop and prevent international atrocities 
(Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2002, 1).   
Although the creation of a court to end impunity for international crimes was 
celebrated by many, critics worried about the impact of the ICC in ongoing conflicts. 
Specifically, some scholars argued that, “When faced with indictment and punishment, a 
human rights abuser might in fact dig in his heels, and refuse to give up or compromise” 
(Ginsburg 2009, 502). This debate over the ICC has been termed the “peace versus 
justice” debate with scholars wondering if the ICC forces a choice between peace and 
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justice. The question this thesis grapples with is the whether the ICC does pursue justice 
to the detriment of a peace process.  
 States join the ICC to show a credible commitment to the prosecution of 
international crimes. However, there are times when states need to show a credible 
commitment to not prosecute (e.g. times when states need to be able to grant an amnesty) 
to achieve other goals, such as peace process resolution (Ginsburg 2009, 500).  Because 
the ICC makes the credible promise of amnesties difficult (if not impossible) (Ginsburg 
2009, 500), many scholars argue that peace is sacrificed for justice. This thesis will 
investigate the peace versus justice debate by looking specifically at the implications of 
ICC arrest warrants on the peace process bargaining model. This thesis looks at the 
impact of introducing a third party – with set, unmoveable preferences – into a typical 
two party bargaining model.   
 This thesis is divided into five parts: part one will engage in a literature review to 
provide background on the current state of the peace versus justice literature; part two 
will introduce the theory this thesis proposes; part three will engage in an empirical test 
of the theory; part four will be a case illustration; and part five will offer conclusions and 
recommendations for future research.  
Part One: Literature Review 
Although much literature focuses on the positive role of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) in ending impunity, some scholars have critically questioned the 
impact of the ICC (Ginsburg 2009, 501). These skeptical scholars focus on whether the 
ICC makes peace and justice mutually exclusive. The debate over the existence of this 
dichotomy has been termed the peace versus justice debate. This debate intensified with 
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the Juba Peace Process in Uganda and the concurrent ICC arrest warrants. There was an 
outcry from civilians and NGO activists that the ICC arrest warrants would prevent a 
peace deal. Betty Bigombe, the head of peace negotiations in Uganda, felt so strongly 
that the ICC would harm peace processes that she threatened to abandon the peace 
process (Branch 2007, 183-184). The peace versus justice debate was brought to the 
public’s attention with many arguing that the ICC’s goal of ending impunity sacrifices 
the opportunity for peace.   
The opinions on this debate vary. In an interview on June 8, 2012, Christopher 
Hall of Amnesty International expressed that the ICC may stall peace but ending 
impunity is the most important goal. Other scholars such as Adam Branch (2009) argue 
that, as in the case in Uganda, the arrest warrants absolutely prevent a peace deal from 
being reached because of the removal of amnesty from the bargaining table. Branch 
explains that this occurs despite popular demand for an amnesty and conclusion to the 
war from the people most affected by the war (184). The existing literature on the peace 
versus justice debate presents theoretical arguments based on credible commitments and 
the politics of intervention in ongoing conflicts to argue that the ICC will stall or inhibit 
peace in the international crusade to end impunity.    
The literature begins with the base assumption that countries commit to the ICC 
to credibly signal that they will prosecute international criminals (Ginsburg 2009, 503). 
Simmons and Danner (2010) produced a study based on credible commitment that 
showed counterintuitive results. They found that nondemocracies with recent histories of 
civil war were three times more likely to commit themselves to the Rome Statute than 
comparable nondemocracies without a similar conflict history (240). Simmons and 
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Danner identified two main reasons states would join the ICC: 1) they did not anticipate 
that their government would ever engage in activity that would fall under the jurisdiction 
of the ICC (i.e. Scandinavian countries); or 2) the signing governments want to use the 
ICC in a calculated way to credibly commit to reducing violence by promising to 
prosecute and to be prosecuted (231-232). Under reason two, countries with recent 
histories of war but weak internal prosecuting institutions could gain significantly from 
ICC involvement if the government were threatened by rebels (234-235). Therefore the 
countries that may most need to be able to offer amnesties in the future could be the same 
countries that were making a credible commitment to prosecute. This shows that 
answering the peace versus justice debate is important and relevant as the ICC continues 
to develop as an institution and its docket continues to grow.  
Tom Ginsburg (2009) explains the problem with countries credibly committing 
themselves to prosecuting international criminals. While signing onto the Rome Statute 
shows a commitment to ending impunity, it is possible that in the future a nation may 
want to credibly promise not to prosecute and be able to credibly offer amnesty (for the 
accomplishment of a peace agreement) (500). While a domestic government may 
genuinely offer an amnesty, the accused (and the home government) will realize that 
amnesties are no longer simply a domestic matter. The ICC can press charges regardless 
of a domestic deal as these agreements are not binding on the ICC. Thus, by signing the 
Rome Statute, many domestic governments sign away a powerful negotiation tool 
(Ginsburg 2009, 507-508). Because the ICC needs to act apolitically and uniformly to 
end impunity and maintain its credibility (regardless of the concerns of pragmatists), the 
accused will take a strategy of not agreeing to a peace deal in the expectation that the ICC 
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will pursue prosecution (Ginsburg 2009, 509-510). Ginsburg (2009) argues that “by 
taking the power to give effective amnesties away from government, we may in fact 
exacerbate some of the worst human rights abuses” (507). However, at the same time, 
Ginsburg recognizes the need to prosecute. Without a real threat of prosecution, amnesty 
would not be a meaningful negotiation tool (508). Amnesty and prosecution are 
interconnected, and the ICC creates a commitment problem that brings this relationship 
to the forefront.  
The ICC’s case against Uganda provided the opportunity to view the 
interconnected role of amnesty and prosecution. Scholars started to look pragmatically at 
the impact of ICC arrest warrants on peace processes. Adam Branch (2007) applied his 
peace versus justice argument to the case of Uganda and Sarah Nouwen (2012) used the 
Uganda case study to challenge the ideology around the ICC of “no peace without 
justice” (Nouwen 2012, 172). Other scholars and supporters of the ICC have used the 
Uganda case study to argue that the ICC encourages peace. For example, they argued that 
because the Juba Peace talks began just months after the ICC arrest warrants were issued, 
the ICC can help bring about peace (Nouwen 2012, 180). Thus, theoretical arguments 
began to be grounded in case studies. 
 Recently, as the ICC has grown its docket and consequently the sample size for 
study, scholars have begun to test their theories using empirical analysis. In 2013 at the 
Peace Sciences Society, Alyssa Prorok presented her research that showed that war 
duration in which there was no ICC involvement had a lower probability of conflict 
survival (i.e. higher likelihood of termination) than war duration in which there was ICC 
involvement (Prorok 2013, slide 13).  
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 The peace versus justice debate has included theoretical debates, case studies, 
credible commitment theory, political analysis of the nature of the ICC, and now 
empirical analysis. The literature is missing an analysis of the impact of ICC arrest 
warrants grounded in bargaining model theory. Therefore, I will theorize about the 
introduction of the ICC to a bargaining model built around two actors. Through 
quantitative analysis, I will test the results I expect to see from my theory and I will apply 
my theory to a case illustration.  
Part 2: Theory 
In peace agreements, amnesty is often offered as a bargaining chip to induce a 
rebel actor to sign an agreement. However, in “The Amnesty Exception to the 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court”, Michael Scharf (1999) explains that it is 
not realistic to expect a rebel actor to sign an agreement if he or she can reasonably 
expect to be prosecuted shortly after signing the agreement (508). This would clearly be 
acting against the rational self-interest of the rebel leaders. In case studies of Haiti, South 
Africa, and the Dayton Accords, Scharf demonstrated that an “amnesty may be a 
necessary bargaining chip to induce human rights violators to agree to peace and 
relinquish power” (508-509). Ginsburg (2009) explains that when facing prosecution, an 
international criminal might refuse to give up rather than compromise (502). 
Figure 1 shows the options and outcomes Actor B (the rebel actor) would face in 
a peace agreement in which amnesty is not a possible outcome.  
 
 
 
 Sturkey 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 1, cooperate means to sign and honor a peace agreement and defect 
means to not agree to and/or not honor a peace agreement. In this case, Actor B has two 
choices. If Actor B cooperates, Actor B will be arrested, resulting in Actor B will losing 
all of their resources, facing prosecution, and – most likely – facing some sort of 
sentence. The value of cooperation is thus any concessions gained for a peace agreement 
minus the loss of freedom and resources. If Actor B defects, Actor B will be able to elude 
arrest – even if only temporarily. The value of defecting is thus the value of retaining 
freedom or resources, any potential further profit to be gained from continuing the war, 
minus the probability of losing the war and not having any of the concessions offered in 
the peace agreement. Thus, for a rational Actor B, choosing to cooperate would have a 
payoff of 1 or 2, and defecting – or not agreeing to a peace resolution – has a payoff of 3 
or 4. Although Actor B may have incentives to participate in a peace process, ultimately, 
without the promise of an amnesty, Actor B is incentivized to defect.  
For Actor A, it is possible that due to pressure from constituents, Actor A may 
genuinely want to reach a peace agreement. However, Actor A must respond to Actor B’s 
FIGURE 1: Peace process without an amnesty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cooperate 
Cooperate 
Defect 
Actor B 
Actor A 
Defect 
Peace agreement; 
Actor B arrested 
(2,2) 
Actor A gains 
advantage;  
Actor B arrested 
(4,1) 
 
Actor B gains 
advantage;  
Actor B eludes arrest 
(1,4) 
War continues; 
Actor B eludes 
arrest 
(3, 3) 
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clear, dominant strategy. As established, Actor B’s dominant strategy is to defect. Thus, 
with the expectation that Actor B will defect, Actor A sets their own strategy. I assume 
that Actor A does not want to cooperate if Actor B is going to defect; Actor A would not 
want to be on the receiving end of a first-strike breaking a stalemate or be caught 
unprepared if Actor B does not honor portions of the agreement. Thus, cooperating has a 
payoff of 1 or 2 for Actor A and defecting has a payoff of 3 or 4. Actor A would much 
rather fall into the bottom right corner of the dilemma than the top right corner of the 
dilemma. The relative payoffs incentivize both Actor A and Actor B to defect, resulting 
in a nash equilibrium that continues the status quo (i.e. the war).  
Figure 2 shows the choices Actor B would face if the promise of an amnesty were 
a possible outcome of a peace negotiation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case, Actor A signals their strategy first by offering an amnesty. The 
offering of an amnesty signals that Actor A is willing to cooperate rather than defect. 
This willingness to cooperate is likely from constituent pressure to reach a peace 
FIGURE 2: Peace process with amnesty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cooperate 
Cooperate 
Defect 
Actor B 
Actor A 
Defect 
Peace agreement; 
Actor B not 
arrested 
(4, 4) 
Actor A gains an 
advantage;  
Actor B not arrested 
(3, 1) 
Actor B gains 
advantage;  
Actor B not arrested 
(1, 3) 
Conflict continues; 
Actor B not 
arrested 
(2, 2) 
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agreement. In this case, Actor A’s preferences are: peace agreement (4) > Actor A gains 
advantage (3) > status quo (2) > Actor B gains an advantage (1).  
Actor B responds to this strategy. Once again, Actor B has two choices – continue 
the war or accept the peace agreement. If Actor B continues the war, Actor B could 
achieve additional profit, but Actor B risks being caught in the future and not having the 
option of amnesty. If Actor B accepts the peace agreement, Actor B would forgo any 
additional profit from continuing the war but would be guaranteed his freedom and 
current resources. Actor B could still choose to defect, but the payoff for cooperation has 
changed. So long as the risk of continuing the war is greater than the profit expected from 
continuing the war, Actor B’s new preferences are: peace agreement (4) > Actor B 
gaining an advantage (3) > status quo (2) > Actor A gaining an advantage (1). In this 
case, both actors prefer to cooperate if the other will cooperate and defect if the other 
defects. Therefore, with amnesty on the table, cooperate-cooperate is the nash 
equilibrium and a peace agreement resolution can be reached.  
As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, Actor A and Actor B’s strategy – cooperate or 
defect – depends on the deal being offered. In all peace negotiations there exists a 
bargaining range – a set of deals that both parties prefer to the returning to war (Frieden, 
Lake, and Schultz 2010, 92). The bargaining range is composed of the individual 
preferences of the two actors.  Figure 3 shows Actor A’s preferences.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Preferences for Actor A 
Actor A 
P1-a Actor A Ideal 
Outcomes A prefers to war A prefers war 
P 
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As demonstrated in Figure 3, P is the predicted outcome of the war. There is a cost to A 
for continuing the war (diminishing returns for continuing the war); this cost is labeled 
P1-a. Actor A would be willing to accept anything to the right of P1-a because the cost is 
less than the cost of continuing the war. Actor A is unwilling to accept anything to the 
left of P1-a because it is more costly to Actor A than the cost of continuing the war 
(Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2010, 91-93). Similarly, Actor B has preferences, which are 
shown in Figure 4.  
 
 
  
 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 4, there is also a cost to B for continuing the war; this cost is 
labeled P1+b. Actor B would be willing to accept anything to the left of P1+b because the 
cost is less than the cost of continuing the war. Actor B is unwilling to accept anything to 
the right of P1+b because it is more costly to Actor B than the cost of continuing the war 
(Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2010, 91-93).  
 Figure 5 shows the combination of Actor A and Actor B’s preferences.  
 
 
 
As shown, there is an overlap among the outcomes Actor A would accept over war and 
the outcomes Actor B would accept over war (Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2010, 91-93). 
Figure 4: Preferences for Actor B 
Actor B Ideal 
Actor B 
P1+b 
Outcomes B prefers to war B prefers war 
Figure 5: Bargaining Range for Actor A and Actor B 
Actor B 
P1+b P1-a 
Outcomes Actor a and B would both agree to Actor A 
P 
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Thus, an organic bargaining range develops is which a resolution is possible. There is a 
range of outcomes that both actors would accept, and a successful peace negotiation 
occurs when a deal is negotiated that falls within this mutually agreeable range.  
 I make several key assumptions about Actor A and Actor B’s bargaining ranges. 
First, the bargaining ranges are representative of a zero sum game. Shifts within the 
bargaining range result in moving closer to one party’s ideal point and further away from 
another party’s ideal point. Thus, shifts result in making one party better off and one 
party worse off (Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2010, 52). Second, I assume that – even 
though it is a zero sum game – the two actors can move with fluidity within the range in 
which they both agree; there are no issues of indivisibility within the mutually agreeable 
range. Third, I assume that the actors involved are rational; they make predictable 
decisions based on positive and negative incentives.  
Combining the bargaining ranges with the preferences detailed in the prisoner’s 
dilemmas, I theorize that Actor B will not accept a peace deal without the promise of an 
amnesty and could accept a peace deal with the promise of amnesty. Returning to Figure 
5, I assume that everything to the left of P1+b includes some sort of promise of amnesty 
in the deal, and everything to the right of P1+b does not include a promise of amnesty. 
Accordingly, Actor B will not accept a peace deal without a promise of amnesty. Because 
this theory also assumes that the Actors do have overlapping preferences, a successful 
peace deal (found in range P1-a, P1+b) could include an amnesty for Actor A.  
ICC arrest warrants affect the peace process by preventing Actor A from offering 
a credible promise of an amnesty because the ability to prevent prosecution is no longer 
solely in Actor A’s hands. Traditionally, third parties are able to solve credibility 
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problems by offering a guarantee of implementation or compliance (Walter 2009, 255). 
Many studies have found that “civil wars are significantly more likely to end in a 
negotiated settlement if an outside state or international organization has sent 
peacekeepers to help with implementation” (Walter 2009, 255).  However, the ICC 
brings in a new type of third-party influence.  Unlike peacekeepers who are neutral and 
monitor the compliance of a deal agreed upon by the negotiating parties, the ICC can 
only support certain deals. Because the ICC arrest warrants serve as a credible promise to 
prosecute, they cannot support a peace deal that contains the promise of an amnesty. 
Furthermore, the ICC has sent a strong signal of their credible promise to prosecute 
through the arrest warrants and through former Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo’s responses 
to critics. Ocampo operated the ICC under the vision of prosecuting each case whenever 
there is jurisdiction for ICC  regardless of local politics (Ginsburg 2005, 510). Therefore, 
the presence of the ICC alters the bargaining range by adding a third party with set 
preferences. The new bargaining range is shown in Figure 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
The ICC has a minimum deal they would be willing to accept; one in which they would 
still act on their arrest warrants and prosecute Actor B. Thus, the ICC will not comply 
with any peace deal to the left of its minimum deal point and will only comply with peace 
deals to the right of the minimum deal point. However, the ICC’s minimum deal point is 
Figure 6: Bargaining Range for Actor A, Actor B, and the ICC 
Actor B 
P1+b P1-a 
Actor A 
ICC 
Deals the ICC supports Deals unacceptable to the ICC 
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outside of the organic bargaining range created by the overlap of Actor A and Actor B’s 
preferences; the ICC’s minimum deal point is in the range within which Actor B prefers 
war to any other outcome. Accordingly, Actor A cannot offer Actor B a deal within their 
mutually agreed upon bargaining range; thus, Actor B will not accept a peace deal. 
Consequently, the presence of ICC arrest warrants eliminates the possibility of a 
successful peace deal. 
This theory predicts that the ICC renders the resolution of a peace process 
impossible by introducing a third party who mandates a certain kind of peace agreement 
outside of an organic bargaining range. Thus, this theory can be tested by looking at cases 
in which the ICC is involved to see if a peace process was reached. If peace process 
resolutions are reached, then support for my theory is not found; however, if peace 
process resolutions are not reached, then I do find support for my theory. Accordingly, 
the hypothesis I will test is: ICC arrest warrants prevent the successful resolution of a 
peace process (measured by the signing and implementation of a peace agreement). 
However, as a peace processes could fail for many other reasons, I will need to ensure 
that any testing controls for other possibilities, so that I can conclude – as confidently as 
possible – that the lack of a successful peace process resolution is correlated with the ICC 
arrest warrants rather than another factor.  
Part Three: Empirical Analysis 
Set Up 
 As explained above, the ICC has been involved in a small number of cases. 
However, Alyssa Prorok compiled a useable database on the ICC (Prorok 2013). For her 
database, she used all civil conflict dyads from Cunningham, Salehyan, and Gleditsch’s 
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Non-State Actor dataset for the years 2002-2010 and expanded on their work. In their 
codebook, Cunningham, Salehyan, and Gleditsch explain that they define a civil conflict 
using the Uppsala Armed Conflict Data (1). According to the Armed Conflict Codebook, 
conflict is defined as concerning a government and/or territory where there is a use of 
armed force between two parties and at least 25 battle-related deaths (1). In Prorok’s 
database, five dyads in four countries – Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Sudan, and the Central African Republic – within the data set received an ICC arrest 
warrant (see Appendix for context of all seven of the ICC’s active cases).  
 I selected this database because Prorok coded for several important variables 
related to the ICC – warrant at the country level, warrant at the dyad level, ICC active on 
country level, and ICC active on dyad level. The database includes data for all civil 
conflicts that occurred from 2002-2010. Each year of conflict for a particular dyad in a 
particular country is listed, and the data are coded as time dummy variables. A 0 is listed 
if the conflict did not terminate in that year and a 1 is listed if the conflict terminated in 
that year. The same is true for ICC arrest warrants (i.e. if a warrant was in place in the 
year) and ICC involvement (i.e. if the ICC was involved in that year) (Prorok 2014 1). 
Because I am testing for the impact of ICC arrest warrants on ending conflict 
through a peace process, my dependent variable is whether or not the conflict terminated. 
The Uppsala Armed Conflict Codebook explains that conflict is coded as having ended if 
the conflict is inactive the following year (11). Unfortunately, this is a proxy variable as it 
does not directly test for my outcome – termination by peace process resolution – but 
tests for termination generally. I recognize that termination can occur through two main 
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ways: 1) One side loses or 2) an agreement is reached.  Because this dependent variable 
covers both options, I will control for one side losing.  
My independent variable of interest is ICC arrest warrants at the dyad level. 
Specifically, I am looking to see if ICC arrest warrants at the dyad level have a positive 
or negative association with conflict termination. Based on my hypothesis, I anticipate 
that ICC arrest warrants at the dyad level will be negatively associated with conflict 
termination by preventing the successful resolution of a peace process, and consequently 
termination of the conflict. Based on my theory, I hypothesize that I will see this result at 
the dyad level because the ICC arrest warrant will impose set preferences in that specific 
dyad’s actor’s bargaining range.  
In my analysis I will consider six controls. I used control variables to help isolate 
and analyze the effect of ICC arrest warrants on conflict termination. To fully test my 
hypothesis, I want to ensure I am seeing just the impact of ICC arrest warrants, and not 
ICC arrest warrants and another factor. Accordingly, I used control variables to control 
for other obvious alternative explanations (for example, the strength of one of the sides 
leading to the termination of a war).  
First, I control for the alternative termination outcome – one side losing the war. I 
do so by including the variable “Relative Strength”. This variable measures the relative 
strength of side b. It is coded 0 if side b is much weaker than the state, 1 if side b is 
weaker than the state, and 2 if side b is equivalent to or stronger than the state (Prorok 
2014, 2). Because this variable takes into account the relative strength of side b against 
the state, it can control for one side losing (either side b or the state). This variable is 
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obviously a subjective variable as there is no perfectly objective way to measure relative 
strength. However, Prorok coded this variable using Cunningham, Salehyan, and 
Gleditsch Non-State Actor dataset (Prorok 2014, 1), which is a well-respected dataset.  
Second, I control for intervention in the conflict. Often, third party involvement 
can enhance the relative strength of one side in combat or in peace negotiations. For 
example, the involvement of the United States/United Nations in the conflict in Bosnia in 
the early 1990s led to an expedited termination of the conflict. Accordingly, I included 
the variable “Balanced Intervention” which is coded 0 if only one side is receiving third 
party support and coded 1 if both sides are receiving third party support (Prorok 2014, 2).  
Third, I control for the country’s financial position. Paul Collier and Anke 
Heffler’s work (2002) on conflict theory highlights the importance of “greed” – or the 
role of financial opportunity – in starting and continuing civil conflict (1). Therefore, I 
used the variable “GDP” – the natural log of GDP per capita (Prorok 2014, 2) – to control 
for the rebel’s financial opportunities of engaging in and continuing the war.  
Fourth, I controlled for whether or not the rebel group controlled territory using a 
dummy variable “Rebel Territory”. This variable was created by Prorok (2014) using the 
NSA dataset (1). I included it because this variable, combined with “Relative Strength” 
and “Duration” (explained below), tested for an alternative hypothesis articulated by 
Prorok (2013) that cases in which the ICC are involved are also the “worst” cases. 
Accordingly, it could be that the ICC becomes involved in the worst cases which, 
because they are the worst cases, would be the slowest to terminate anyway, rather than 
the hypothesis that the cases are slower to terminate because of ICC involvement.  
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Although there is a robust sample size – 398 observations – these observations 
come from 111 dyads in 42 countries for the years 2002-2010. In this data set, the 
observations are not independent across time because each year of a conflict is not 
separated from each other. For example, in the previous year, one side could have been 
substantially weakened leading to conflict termination in the subsequent year. 
Accordingly, I control for time. To do so, this model uses the method advocated for by 
David Carter and Curtis Signorino – including duration, duration^2, and duration^3 in the 
model – to control for the time dependency (Carter and Signorino 2010, 271).  
Finally, I control for the fact that the observations are not dependent across space. 
In this data, there are obvious groups within the data that make the data not perfectly 
random. Once conflict occurs in one country, all the observations of conflict (e.g. conflict 
in that country in 2002, 2003, and 2004) are selected. Accordingly, the observations are 
clustered. I control for this lack of separation by using Stata’s cluster tool on country 
code.  
Test 
 For this test, my null hypothesis is that warrants at the dyad level should not have 
an impact on conflict termination. My alternative hypothesis is that warrants at the dyad 
level do have an impact on conflict termination (thus, this is a two-sided t-test). However, 
based on my theory, I would expect that if I am able to accept the null hypothesis, the 
impact would be negative (i.e. it is associated with a decrease in conflict termination).  
 Because the dependent variable – conflict termination – is a binary variable, I 
used a logit model and clustered for the country code. Table 1 shows my results. 
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Terminate Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
Z P>|z| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Warrant at Dyad Level -1.525 .365 -4.18 .000 -2.241, -.809 
Balanced Intervention .155 .535 0.29 .771 -.893, 1.205 
Duration -.344 .134 -2.55 .011 -.607, -.080 
Duration^2 .023 .013 1.74 .082 -.003, .050 
Duration^3 -.000 .000 -1.52 .129 -.001, .000 
GDP -.210 .129 -1.62 .105 -.465, .044 
Relative Strength .259 .299 .86 .387 -.328, .847 
Rebel Territory .333 .268 1.24 .214 -.192, .859 
Constant 1.148 1.056 1.09 .277 -.922, 3.218 
     N = 398 
 
 Based on my analysis, I am able to reject the null hypothesis that warrants at the 
dyad level do not have an impact on conflict termination and accept the alternative 
hypothesis that warrants at the dyad level do have an impact on conflict termination. 
Specifically, warrants at the dyad level should have a negative impact on conflict 
termination with an impact on the slope of negative 1.525; this finding is statistically 
significant with a p-value of .000. 
Additionally, it is important to note that out of the 398 observations, only 17 of 
these observations are coded for having an ICC arrest warrant at the dyad level. To date, 
the ICC has indicted 32 people from seven different countries – the Democratic Republic 
Table 1: Logit model  testing dependent variable of conflict termination 
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of Congo, the Central African Republic, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, and the Cote 
d’Ivoire (“All Cases”). Thus, I expect that over time, as the sample of arrest warrants at 
the dyad level grows, these findings will grow in strength and robustness.  
To test the dependency of my model, I used the logit test and included other 
independent variables coded by Prorok such as the natural log of the country’s 
population, the natural log of the number of dyads fighting the state, and the country’s 
polity score (coded 1 if between -6 and 6) (Prorok). As Table 2 shows, even when 
including these other variables, the p-value for warrants at the dyad level was .000.  
 
Terminate Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
Z P>|z| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Warrant at Dyad Level -1.731 .427 -4.05 .000 -2.569, -.892 
Balanced Intervention -.282 .679 -0.42 .678 -1.613, 1.049 
Duration -.317 .134 -2.36 .018 -.580, -.053 
Duration^2 .022 .012 1.75 .080 -.002, .047 
Duration^3 -.000 .000 -1.61 .108 -.001, .000 
GDP -.216 .138 -1.56 .119 -.487, .055 
Relative Strength .333 .300 1.11 .266 -.254, .922 
Rebel Territory .215 .289 0.75 .456 -.350, .782 
Population -.244 .100 -2.43 .015 -.442, -.047 
# of Dyads fighting .622 .265 2.35 .019 .103, 1.142 
Polity Score .086 .419 .21 .836 -.734, .908 
constant 3.231 1.620 1.99 .046 .055, 6.408 
     N = 398 
Table 2: Logit model with additional variables 
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I also tried substituting warrants at the dyad level with warrants at the country 
level and clustering around dyad i.d.. In this logit analysis, the coefficient for warrants at 
the country level was -.8923 with a statistically significant p-value of .038. Thus, as 
shown in Table 3, I was still able to – with 95% confidence – reject the null hypothesis 
that ICC arrest warrants did not have an impact on conflict termination.  
 
Terminate Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
Z P>|z| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Warrant at Cntry Level -.892 .429 -2.08 .038 -1.733, -.051 
Balanced Intervention .146 .416 .35 .724 -.668, .962 
Duration -.356 .140 -2.54 .011 -.631, -.081 
Duration^2 .024 .014 1.69 .090 -.003, .052 
Duration^3 -.000 .000 -1.47 .142 -.001, .000 
GDP -.247 .139 -1.78 .076 -.521, .025 
Relative Strength .251 .292 .86 .391 -.322, .824 
Rebel Territory .349 .330 1.06 .291 -.298, .996 
constant 1.487 1.119 1.33 .184 -.705, 3.681 
     N = 398 
 
Additionally, I deliberately excluded many variables such as ICC involvement at 
the dyad level or ICC involvement at the country level because of multicollinearity. I 
assumed that an arrest warrant would not be present at the dyad level or the country level 
if the ICC was not involved at the dyad or country level. Accordingly, including both 
Table 3: Logit model clustering around dyad i.d. rather than country code Table 3: Logit model clustered around dyad rather than country 
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variables increased the standard errors which in turn increased the p-values as it was 
difficult to tell which variable was having which effect due to the overlap. 
Some weaknesses of the model include the inability to test my exact dependent 
variable (i.e. termination due to a peace process resolution rather than any termination), 
the dependency of the observations (although this was controlled for), and the relatively 
small sample size. However, my findings were significant even when controlling the 
relative strength of side b, time, the financial opportunity of the war, the impact of third 
party intervention, and dependency of the observations around country groupings which 
allows me to be confident in my conclusions.  
Based on this data analysis, I find that ICC warrants are negatively correlated with 
conflict termination. However, I would like to attempt to move beyond just correlation, 
and see if I can find a causal link for ICC arrest warrants preventing or prolonging 
conflict termination. Thus, I will use a case illustration to perform an in-depth analysis of 
one of the data points included in Prorok’s database – the case against the Lord’s 
Resistance Army in Uganda. I will apply my theory to the actual reality of the situation in 
the Uganda to see if I can logically trace the lack of a successful peace process resolution 
to the arrest warrants served by the ICC.  
Part Four: Case Illustration 
 As stated, for my case illustration, I have selected the Juba Peace talks of 2006-
2008 in which the participating parties were the government of Uganda (led by President 
Museveni) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (led by Joseph Kony).  In addition to being a 
data point in Prorok’s database, the peace process for this case was well documented with 
the many different NGOs and governments participating in the peace process releasing 
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reflections and updates on the process; thus, a lot of resources are available for analysis. 
Concerning these talks, a local leader, Father Carlose Rodriguez of the Acholi Religious 
Leaders’ Peace Initiative, stated, “Obviously, nobody can convince the leaders of a rebel 
movement to come to the negotiating table and at the same time tell them that they will 
appear in courts to be prosecuted” (Branch 2009, 183). Clearly, these talks exhibit the 
relationship between peace and justice that I want to examine.   
President Yoweri Museveni came to power in January 1986 after fighting the 
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) (Allen 2005, 10). In response to the conflict 
following Museveni’s rise to power, many “nebi” – people who claimed to have been 
endowed with power from spirits – began to emerge (Allen 2005, 11-13). The largest cult 
developed around a woman named Alice Lakenwa, and she created The Holy Spirit 
Movement (HSM). In October 1987 the HSM was defeated by Museveni’s forces, the 
National Resistance Army (NRA) (Allen 2005, 13-15).  
While the HSM was active, Joseph Kony claimed that he was Alice’s cousin and 
that he was possessed by spirits too (Allen 2005, 16). While Alice recruited in Kitgum, 
Kony recruited followers in Gulu. In 1988, Museveni signed a peace agreement with 
leaders of the Ugandan People’s Democratic Army (UPDA). UPDA forces that were 
unwilling to surrender joined Kony (Allen 2005, 16). Kony named his movement the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Since 1988, the LRA has been engaged in a guerilla 
campaign against the government of Uganda (Allen 2005, 17). The LRA has engaged in 
“massacres, maimings, and the forced recruitment of thousands of Acholi” (Branch 2007, 
180).  
 Sturkey 25 
 
In 1991, the government launched Operation North, an intense insurgency 
attempting to end the conflict. The LRA responded aggressively and hundreds were 
killed (Allen 2005, 20). However, despite the conflict of Operation North, in 1994 
Bigombe was able to engage the LRA and, during peace talks, arranged a cease fire 
(Branch 2005, 20). Ultimately, the peace talks ended when Museveni issued a seven day 
ultimatum to the LRA requiring them to turn themselves over to the government (Allen 
2005, 21). Then, in the mid-1990s, the Sudanese Government provided support to the 
LRA in return for the LRA assisting Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir in fighting the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (Allen 2005, 21). Following this new support, 
in 1996, the LRA agreed to ceasefire and offered a permanent ceasefire if Museveni was 
not reelected (Allen 2005, 22).  
In 2000, the Uganda Amnesty Act was created (Allen 2005, 32) at the request of 
the Acholi people – those most impacted by the violence (Branch 2007, 184). They 
lobbied for the creation of the Act because, according to Branch, they understood “that 
the war [would] not end until the LRA leadership abandon[ed] the rebellion” and wanted 
to provide an incentive for them to do so (2007, 184). In 2002, Museveni launched 
Operation Iron Fist in which the Ugandan Army, renamed to the Uganda Peoples 
Defence Force (UPDF) partnered with the SPLA to eliminate the LRA (Allen 2005, 22). 
In 2003, President Museveni referred “the Situation Concerning the Lord’s 
Resistance Army” to the ICC. The Ugandan government explained, 
“Having exhausted every other means of bringing an end to this terrible suffering, 
the Republic of Uganda now turns to the newly established ICC and its promise of 
 Sturkey 26 
 
global justice. Uganda pledges its full cooperation to the Prosecutor in the 
investigation and prosecution of LRA crimes, achievement of which is vital not 
only for the future progress of the nation, but also for the suppression of the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” (Branch 
2007, 182-183). 
In July 2004 the Office of the Prosecutor officially opened an investigation and in 
October 2005 arrest warrants were issued against Joseph Kony and four top commanders 
of the Lord’s Resistance Army. They were charged with both war crimes and crimes 
against humanity (Branch 2007, 179). These arrest warrants overruled the Uganda 
Amnesty Act (Branch 2007, 184). Also in 2004, Museveni launched a second Iron Fist 
offensive (Allen 2005, 23).  
Adam Branch argues that the government of Uganda was set to gain from ICC 
intervention. By labeling his opponent as a criminal, Museveni was able to legitimize his 
side of the war, and use the ICC for his own benefit (Branch 2007, 183). Nouwen (2012) 
emphasized the importance of referring the “situation regarding the LRA” and not the 
“situation in Uganda” (176). Branch explains that this referral was on purpose; Museveni 
was able to protect himself and his army from being investigated (Branch 2007, 179-
180). The result was that Museveni has been able to quiet political opposition, gain 
international support, and justify defense spending on the army that keeps him in power 
(2007, 185). Thus, Branch hypothesizes that it is possible that Uganda referred the 
situation to the ICC not to bring about an end to the war, but to gain justification for their 
side of the war (2007, 185-186) and allow Museveni to focus on a military only solution 
(184). 
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The reactions to the arrest warrants were highly polarized. Many celebrated the 
ICC’s involvement and supported the ending of impunity for Kony to achieve “justice”. 
However, many Ugandans, especially the leaders of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace 
Initiative, were outspoken in condemning the warrants (Allen 2005 42-43). Father Carlos 
Rodriguez stated, “The issuing… of international arrest warrants would practically close 
once and for all the path to peaceful negotiation as a means to end this long war…” 
(Allen 2005, 43). Even Ugandan government officials, such as the Amnesty Commission 
spokesperson, recognized that excluding Kony and other LRA leaders from the Amnesty 
Act would make ending the war more difficult (Allen 2005, 43). Allen (2005) conducted 
a group interview with people at Awere IDP camp. One man stated, “The ICC is going to 
make the war continue because those commanders who will be willing to come back will 
be discouraged and continue fighting” (50-51).  
Surprisingly, however, only a few months after the arrest warrants were issued, 
the LRA agreed to enter into peace talks with the Ugandan government. Thus, the Juba 
Peace talks began in 2006 (Nouwen 2012, 180). Many advocates for the ICC claimed that 
the arrest warrants served as the catalyst that brought Kony to the negotiating table. 
Although perhaps the international pressure that an ICC arrest warrant carries is what 
spurred Kony to reach out, Nouwen (2012) argues that perhaps the effect was less direct. 
Nouwen points to the fact that the ICC’s arrest warrants caused the government of Sudan 
to withdraw their support for the LRA and join the government of Uganda in putting 
pressure on the LRA. Thus, the willingness to negotiate could have been a result of the 
LRAs increasing vulnerability, which provided the LRA with an incentive to talk (180). 
The argument presented by Nouwen fits with the key assumption made in this paper – 
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actors will follow the incentives that help them to survive. Thus, for Kony, agreeing to 
participate in peace negotiations could have been an attempt to temporarily survive.  
The Juba Peace talks officially began on July 16, 2006 (Machar 2008, 1). In 
analyzing these peace talks, I assume that, despite the fact that Kony claims to be 
possessed by a spirit, Kony is a rational actor who can respond predictably to incentives. 
This is assumption backed by Tim Allen, who in an interview on July 7, 2012, explained 
that he has personally met with Kony. Allen (2005) points to the LRA’s political agenda 
to suggest that this movement is motivated by more than just the voice of a religious 
spirit. Allen names ten political demands that Kony and the LRA have publicized through 
manifestos and pamphlets (19). Examples of these political goals include “education for 
all” and “relocation of Uganda’s administrative capital to Kigumba in Masindi District” 
(Allen 2005, 19). Allen also suggests that Kony’s use of the “spirits” has been 
purposeful; “terror has been a strategy of choice” (20). In this paper, I assume that Allen 
is correct; Kony is not just a deranged lunatic who hears voices from “spirits” but rather 
makes deliberate choices – such as killing LRA members in front of other LRA members 
or by claiming to be possessed by spirits to instill fear in his troops and thus command 
them.  
In an interview between Allen and a young LRA soldier who had escaped, the 
LRA soldier describes rational, intentional decisions by Kony. He explains that “Kony 
fears to come by himself (in reference to peace talks) so he would rather send his 
representative because he says that he knows what the Government [sic] intentions are..” 
(2005, 35). The young soldier then continues to explain that Kony provided them with 
 Sturkey 29 
 
concrete examples as to why he (Kony) did not trust the government’s intention, such as 
the 2002 peace deal (Allen 2005, 35).  
 For the Juba Peace talks, Riek Machar was mutually agreed upon to be the chief 
mediator (Hendrickson and Tumutegyereize 2012, 6). Machar (2008) explained that 
representation for the LRA was a challenge from the start as Kony and other LRA leaders 
refused to go to Juba in person because of the ICC arrest warrants. Thus, they sent 
representatives on their behalf or communicated through phone or planned visits outside 
of the Juba Peace talks (2). Because the arrest warrants challenged Kony and Museveni’s 
ability to communicate, it was difficult for Kony and Museveni to make clear to each 
other what their individual bargaining models looked like.  
However, despite the communication challenge, six agenda items were discussed, 
and official agreements were signed. These agreements included:  agreement on cessation 
of hostilities, agreement on comprehensive solutions, agreement on accountability and 
reconciliation, agreement on a permanent ceasefire, agreement on disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration, and agreement on implementation and monitoring 
mechanisms (Machar 2008, 2). The fact that these agreements were reached implies that 
Kony and Museveni did have overlapping bargaining ranges resulting in a bargaining 
model in which they could find places of agreement. Figure 7 illustrates this model. 
 
 
For example, in the agreement on accountability and reconciliation, it was agreed that the 
LRA would be removed from the list of Terrorist Organizations upon disarmament by the 
Figure 7: Bargaining Range for Museveni and Kony 
Museveni Outcomes Kony and Museveni would both agree to Kony 
P1+b P1-a 
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LRA (“Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation” 2007, 10). It was also agreed 
that the government of Uganda would develop new legislation providing for alternative 
penalties and sanctions for human rights violations committed by non-state actors 
(“Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation” 2007, 7). Thus, there were items that 
Kony and Museveni could agree to in principle that they favored over the continuation of 
war.  
However, Kony and Museveni were not the only actors in the Juba Peace talks. 
The ICC – through the arrest warrants – acted an external actor. Thus, Figure 8 represents 
the true bargaining range for the Juba Peace talks. 
 
 
 
 In this bargaining model, the ICC imposes a set preference outside of the organic 
bargaining range that exists between Kony and Museveni. This models assumes: 1) that 
the ICC will not accept a deal that does not include prosecution by the ICC; 2) that 
Museveni would be willing to accept either outcome (prosecution by the ICC or 
amnesty); and 3) that Kony will not accept any deal that results in prosecution by the 
ICC.  
 The ICC has made a clear signal to Uganda and the international community that 
they are not willing to accept any deal in which they do not prosecute Kony and the other 
LRA commanders facing ICC arrest warrants. As Ginsburg (2008) explained, the ICC – 
as a new institution – is currently trying to build its own credibility. The ICC needs to 
Figure 8: Bargaining Model for Museveni, Kony, and the ICC 
Actor A Outcomes Kony and Museveni would both agree to Actor B 
P1+b P1-a ICC 
Deals the ICC supports 
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signal to the world that it is a court with “a role to play” (510). ICC Prosecutor Moreno 
Ocampo has explained “that he regularly obtains communications from states, NGOs, 
and parties to various conflicts asking him to refrain from initiating prosecutions so that a 
peace deal can be worked out” (Ginsburg 2008, 509). However, despite these 
communications, Prosecutor Ocampo has stated, “I apply the law without political 
consideration. But the other actors have to adjust to the law.” (Nouwen and Werner 2010, 
942). As the first case initiated by the ICC, and considering the fact that the ICC is still 
pursuing the charges, it seems unlikely that the ICC – which is still trying to build its 
credibility – would be willing to accept an outcome where they do not prosecute Kony. 
Thus, I assume that the location of the ICC’s preferences in Figure 8 is in fact reflective 
of the situation in Juba. 
Although the ICC would not accept any deal which does not involve prosecution, 
it is likely that Museveni would be willing to accept either amnesty or prosecution. 
Because Museveni referred the situation to the ICC, it is easy to conclude that he will be 
willing to accept prosecution (assuming that he does understand the role and functions of 
the ICC). As examined earlier, Branch (2007) argues that Museveni referred the situation 
to justify a military end to the war (185-186). As a military solution would end with 
prosecution, there is support for this assumption.  
Additionally, there is also support for the assumption that Museveni would be 
willing to accept amnesty. Kennedy Tumutegyereize of the NGO Conciliation Resources 
was present and involved at the Juba Peace talks. In his reflections on the talks – written 
with Dylan Hendrickson (2012) – he explains that in Juba, the talks focused on “how to 
find a way around the huge constraints posed by the ICC arrest warrants and convince 
 Sturkey 32 
 
Kony that giving himself up was in his interest – a game that necessitated taking the real 
talks outside the formal Juba framework” (12). In an interview, Tumutegyereize and 
colleague Caesar Poblicks, explained that informal negotiations began to occur outside of 
the public negotiations. These informal negotiations were composed of a small team of 
Kony and Museveni’s most trusted advisors and focused on finding a solution acceptable 
to Kony. This was confirmed in the reflections by Tumutegyereize and Hendrickson 
(2012) as they explained that Museveni began to communicate directly with Kony over 
the phone about Kony’s personal situation to find a resolution (24). Thus, the fact that 
Museveni discussed other options directly with Kony at the least implies that he was 
willing to consider another option than prosecution. Furthermore, Tumutegyereize and 
Hendrickson (2012) wrote that a “gentleman’s agreement” was in fact reached. In this 
agreement, the Ugandan government would ask the United Nation’s Security Council to 
suspend the ICC’s involvement. In return for the suspension, the government of Uganda 
would create a Special Court to try Kony. Kony would be “imprisoned” in Uganda but he 
would maintain some freedoms and be spared “the humiliation of formal incarceration” 
(24). While it is clear this agreement ultimately failed, it does show that Museveni was 
willing to accept some version of amnesty. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that 
Museveni was willing to accept anything to the right of p1-a in Figure 7.  
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that Kony would not be willing to accept any 
deal to the right of p1+b (i.e. any deal that includes prosecution by the ICC). At the very 
beginning of the talks, the LRA asked that the ICC arrest warrants be “withdrawn” 
(Nouwen 2012, 181). As explained above, it was because of this insistence on the 
dropping of the arrest warrants that the informal negotiations between Kony and 
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Museveni developed. However, Hendrickson and Tumutegyereize (2012) commented 
that these negotiations fell apart because Kony refused to sign any agreement without the 
ICC arrest warrants being dropped first (24). In explaining this refusal to sign, Kony has 
referenced Charles Taylor, the former Liberian president who was promised asylum and 
ultimately prosecuted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Nouwen 2012, 181). Thus, 
Kony is aware and hesitant of promises of amnesty without credible proof; consequently, 
Kony is unwilling to accept any deal that does not satisfactorily convince him he would 
not be prosecuted by the ICC (i.e. any deal that he is not convinced is fully within the 
mutually agreeable range). Finally, this theory is supported by the fact that although the 
LRA delegation signed the different Juba Peace talk agreement, Kony has – to date – 
refused to sign the final document (Nouwen 2012, 181). As shown in the prisoner’s 
dilemma in Figure 1, without the promise of an amnesty, Kony’s dominant strategy was 
to defect.  
Based on the supporting evidence I conclude that the ICC is unwilling to accept a 
deal that does not include prosecution, that Museveni is willing to accept a deal with or 
without prosecution, and that Kony is unwilling to accept a deal that includes 
prosecution. Accordingly, the model developed in my theory holds true in this case 
illustration.  
Part Four: Conclusion 
 Since the beginning of the Juba Peace Process in 2006, NGOs, governments, 
civilians, and scholars have claimed that the intervention of the ICC prevented peace in 
the case of Uganda. Furthermore, they fear that this is a universal effect; they fear that the 
ICC will prevent the successful peaceful resolution of conflict in all cases in which the 
 Sturkey 34 
 
ICC intervenes. Currently, the literature has remained broad and theoretical, debating 
topics like the merits of ending impunity. This thesis hopes to contribute to and shift the 
dialogue in the peace versus justice debate by looking at the impact of the ICC arrest 
warrants on peace processes in the traditional two party bargaining model. By grounding 
my argument in bargaining model theory, I shift the discussion to predicting actors’ 
actions through game theory and incentives.  
 I theorized that the ICC imposes set preferences in the bargaining model between 
the two actors. Because I assume that Actor B (the accused Actor) is unwilling to accept 
a deal without an amnesty, and the ICC is unwilling to accept a deal with an amnesty, a 
peace agreement will not be able to be reached. In testing my theory, I found that ICC 
arrest warrants at the dyad level did have a statistically significant impact on conflict 
termination. In line with my prediction, this impact was negative, meaning that ICC arrest 
warrants did decrease the probability of conflict termination. Additionally, I applied my 
theory to the case study of Uganda and found that my assumptions were supported by the 
events that occurred; Kony did not sign a peace agreement and he cited the ICC as the 
main reason why. 
 In an interview with Dapo Akende at Oxford University on June 14, 2012, it was 
pointed out that this research could be expanded by looking at the changing “landscape” 
of peace negotiations. Akende explained that the comparison is no longer peace process 
with ICC arrest warrant versus peace process with no ICC arrest warrant, but rather, 
peace process with ICC arrest warrant versus peace process in which the ICC has not yet 
decided to pursue a case. Thus further research could be on the impact of the international 
presence of the ICC on all peace negotiations (Akende 2012). 
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Unfortunately, this thesis is ultimately limited by the lack of available cases to 
study, as only 17 of the 398 cases included in the dataset used had an ICC arrest warrant. 
However, as the ICC continues to grow its docket, my theory will be able to be further 
tested and applied and in other case studies. Since ratification in 2002, the ICC has set out 
to prove its legitimacy. As the ICC gets further involved in international conflicts, the 
peace versus justice debate will grow, but scholars will be able to gather enough data to 
draw a conclusion grounded in empirical research.   
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Appendix 1: 
ICC Country Involvement  
Currently, the ICC has cases open in seven different countries. The seven 
countries where arrests have occurred are the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central 
African Republic, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, and the Cote d’Ivoire (“All Cases”).  
The ICC initiated six arrest warrants against individuals from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (“All Cases). Although various peace processes have occurred 
during the conflict within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, only one of the 
agreements involved one of the six individuals indicted by the ICC after the arrest 
warrants had been confirmed. Bosco Ntaganda was involved in a peace agreement signed 
on March 23, 2009 (almost three years after his ICC arrest warrant was issued). This 
peace agreement – signed by the government and by leaders of the National Congress for 
the Defense of the People (CNDP) – incorporated the CNDP rebels into the Congolese 
army and Ntaganda was promoted to the role of general in the army. Ntaganda defected 
by forming a new rebel group, M23, named for the peace agreement he defected from 
(Human Rights Watch 2013, 1). 
Initially, the ICC issued one arrest warrant in the Central African Republic for 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (“All Cases”). He was arrested by the Belgian authorities on 
the same day that Pre-Trial Chamber III issued the arrest warrant (“Central African 
Republic”).  Since that time, a second case has been opened with arrest warrants for Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aime Kilolo Musama, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidele 
Babala Wandu, and Narcisse Arido for presenting false or forged evidence and/or 
corrupting a witness (“Central African Republic”). 
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In Uganda, the ICC issued five arrest warrants for top leaders in the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) (“All Cases”). After the issuance, a major peace process – the 
Juba Peace Talks – began between the LRA and the Uganda. Ultimately, the LRA’s top 
commander, Joseph Kony, failed to sign the peace agreement. 
In Sudan, the ICC issued charges for Ahmad Muhammad Harun, Ali Muhammad 
Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Abdel Raheem Muhammad 
Hussein, Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, and Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain (“All Cases”). 
As president of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir has been involved in many peace processes. For 
example, in 2011, the Government of Sudan signed the “Doha Document for Peace in 
Darfur” with Liberation and Justice Movement leaders (such as Bahar Abu Garda who is 
also facing ICC arrest warrants) which established the framework for a comprehensive 
peace process in Darfur (UNAMID) (“Signing of Doha Agreement prompts mixed 
reactions”). However, it is important to note that none of the peace processes Bashir has 
engaged in call for him to step down from office and that much of the violence in Sudan 
is still ongoing.  
In Kenya, the ICC is pursuing charges against William Samoei Ruto, Joshus Arap 
Sang, Uhur Muigai Kenyatta, and Walter Osapiri Barasa (“Kenya”). The peace deal 
ending the violence in Kenya was signed in 2008 (Gettleman 2008); thus, a peace 
agreement was reached before ICC arrest warrants were issued. 
 In Libya, the ICC issued three arrest warrants (“All Cases”). A peace agreement 
was not reached before Mummar Gaddafi passed away, but a peace process was initiated 
and a ceasefire was agreed upon. However, the peace talks broke down when the rebel 
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leaders insisted that Gaddafi and his sons be removed from power (“What peace deal?” 
2011).  
In the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, the ICC has issued three arrest warrants (“All 
Cases”). Peace agreements have not occurred with those facing ICC arrest warrants.  
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Appendix 2: Conflicts included in Prorok’s dataset (2013) 
Conflict ID Years Included Side B Country 
191 2002-2003 GIA Algeria 
191 2002-2010 AQIM Algeria 
131 2002 UNITA Angola, Namibia 
90 2002-2003 CNDD-FDD Burundi 
90 2002-2008 Palipehutu-FNL Burundi 
91 2002 MDJT Chad 
214 2002 Ntsiloulous Congo-Brazzaville, 
Angola, Chad 
133 2002-2010 ONLF Ethiopia 
219 2002-2010 OLF Ethiopia 
225 2002 MPCI Cote D’Ivoire 
225 2002-2003 MPIGO Cote D’Ivoire 
146 2002-2003 LURD Liberia 
179 2002 Opposition Rwanda 
179 2009-2010 FDLR Rwanda 
180 2002-2003 MFDC Senegal 
118 2002-2010 LRA Uganda 
192 2002-2009 FLEC-FAC Angola 
192 2002 FLEC Angola 
141 2002 SRRC Somalia 
10 2002-2010 Communist Philippines 
95 2007-2010 Sendero Peru 
92 2002-2010 FARC Colombia 
112 2002-2010 MILF Philippines 
157 2002-2009 LTTE Sri Lanka 
225 2002-2003 MJP Cote D’Ivoire 
112 2002-2010 Abu Philippines 
112 2002 MNLF Philippines 
139 2002-2006 NLFT India 
222 2002 Faction Central African Republic, 
Libya 
170 2002-2010 ULFA India 
198 2004 Republic Georgia 
198 2008 Republic Georgia 
227 2002-2004 BDSF/NDFB India 
152 2004-2006 PLA India 
137 2003-2010 Taliban Afghanistan 
159 2002-2010 PKK/Kadek Turkey 
152 2002-2009 UNLF India 
92 2002-2010 ELN Colombia 
92 2004 EPL Colombia 
171 2002-2005 GAM Indonesia 
206 2002-2007 Republic Russia 
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72 2002-2006 CPN-M/UPF Nepal 
146 2003 MODEL Liberia 
169 2002-2010 Kashmir India 
224 2002-2010 Al-Qaida USA, Australia, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Jordan, Netherlands, 
Poland 
193 2005 Republic Azerbaijan 
37 2002-2007 Fatah Israel 
37 2002-2010 PIJ Israel 
37 2002-2010 Hamas Israel 
29 2002-2004 Naxalites/PWG India 
29 2002-2004 MCC India 
137 2008-2010 Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan 
37 2002-2004 AMB Israel 
37 2002 PNA Israel 
113 2003-2010 SLM/A Sudan 
113 2003-2010 JEM Sudan 
130 2003 EIJM Eritrea 
225 2004 FN Cote D’Ivoire 
186 2004 FLRN Haiti 
186 2004 OP Haiti 
62 2004-2008 Al-Mahdi Iraq 
62 2004-2007 Ansar iraq 
221 2004 JIG Uzbekistan 
249 2004 Ahlul Nigeria 
62 2004-2010 ISI/Jama’at Iraq 
29 2005-2010 CPI-Maoist India 
54 2005-2007 NSCN India 
91 2005-2005 FUCD Chad 
188 2005 MKP Turkey 
143 2005-2010 PJAK Iran 
248 2003-2010 Patani Thailand 
250 2004 NDPVF Nigeria 
62 2005-2007 RJF/Al-Jaysh Iraq 
222 2006 UFDR Central African Republic 
37 2006 Popular Israel 
113 2006 NRF Sudan 
113 2006 SLM/A Sudan 
141 2006-2008 ARS/UIC Somalia 
91 2006 RAFD Chad 
91 2006-2007 UFDD Chad 
129 2005-2006 Baluch Pakistan 
129 2004-2010 BLA/Baluchistan Pakistan 
143 2006-2010 Jondullah Iran 
113 2002-2004 SPLM Sudan 
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251 2006 Hezbollah Israel 
86 2006-2008 CNDP Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
112 2007 MNLF Philippines 
113 2007-2008 SLM/A-Unity Sudan 
177 2007-2009 ATNMC Mali 
254 2007-2008 BDK Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
209 2007 TNSM Pakistan 
255 2007-2008 MNJ Niger 
152 2008-2009 KCP India 
258 2008 DHD India 
152 2008-2009 PREPAK India 
91 2008 AN Chad 
209 2008-2010 TTP Pakistan 
141 2008-2010 Al-Shabaab Somalia 
141 2008 Harakat Somalia 
259 2008 PULF India 
257 2007-2010 Forces Russia 
129 2008-2009 BRA/Baluchistan Pakistan 
222 2009-2010 CPJP Central African Republic 
91 2009 UFR Chad 
33 2009-2010 AQAP Yemen 
227 2009-2010 NDFB India 
100 2009-2010 Boko Nigeria 
141 2009-2010 Hizbul-Islam Somalia 
267 2010 AQIM Mauritania 
91 2010 PFNR Chad 
113 2010 Forces Sudan 
266 2010 IMU Tajikistan 
 
 
  
 Sturkey 42 
 
Works Cited 
Akende, Dapo. Personal Interview. 14 June 2012. 
 
Allen, Tim. Personal Interview. 7 July 2012.  
Allen, Tim. 2005. "War and Justice in Northern Uganda: An Assessment of the 
International Criminal Court's Intervention." Independent Report. Draft. London 
School of Economics, 2005 
Branch, Adam.  2007.  “Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention.”   
 Ethics & International Affairs 21 (2): 179-198.   
 
Carter, David B. and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. “Back to the Future: Modeling Time  
Dependence in Binary Data.” Political Analysis 18:271-292.  
 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. CSAE  
WPS/2002-01. http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/12055/1/2002-01text.pdf 
 
i
Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. “Codebook for  
 the Non-State Actor Data.” Version 3.3 (24 January 2012). 
 http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_codebook.pdf 
 
Daily Mail Reporter. "What peace deal? Gaddafi's troops batter rebel city despite  
 dictator 'accepting ceasefire'." Last modified April 11, 2011. Accessed  
 November 30, 2013. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article- 
 1375584/Libya-ceasefire-Gaddafi-agrees-deal-end-bloodshed-says-Jacob- 
 Zuma.html. 
Frieden, Jeffry A., David A. Lake, and Kenneth A. Schultz. World Politics: Interests, 
Interactions, Institutions. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2010.  
Gettleman, Jeffrey. The New York Times, "Kenya Rivals Reach Peace Agreement." Last 
modified February 29, 2008. Accessed November 30, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/29/world/africa/29kenya.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=1&. 
Ginsburg, Tom.  2009.  “The Clash of Commitments at the International Criminal Court.”  
Chicago Journal of International Law 9 (1): 499-685.   
Hall, Christopher. Personal Interview. 8 June 2012. Amnesty International, London, UK. 
Hendrickson, Dylan, and Kennedy Tumutegyereize. Dealing with complexity in peace 
negotiations: Reflections on the Lord's Resistance Army and the Juba talks. 
London: Conciliation Resources, 2012. 
 Sturkey 43 
 
Human Rights Watch, "World Report: Democratic Republic of Congo." Last modified 
2013. Accessed October 22, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2013/country-chapters/democratic-republic-congo?page=1. 
International Criminal Court, “About the Court.” Accessed January 2014. 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx 
International Criminal Court, “All Cases.” Accessed November 2013. http://www.icc-
 cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/cases/Pages/cases%20index.asp
 x 
 
International Criminal Court, “Central African Republic.” Accessed April 9 2014.  
http://www.icc-
 cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/ 
situation%20icc%200105/Pages/central%20african%20republic.aspx 
 
International Criminal Court, “Kenya.” Accessed November 2013.  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/ 
situation%20icc%200109/Pages/situation%20index.aspx 
 
International Criminal Court, "Rome Statute of the International Ciminal Court." Last  
modified January 16, 2002. Accessed December 2, 2013. http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-
0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute_English.pdf. 
 
Juba Agenda Item No. 3 Agreement, "Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation."  
Last modified June 29, 2007. Accessed December 1, 2013. 
http://www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/peace_agreements/Agreement_on_Accountabili
ty_And_Reconcilition.pdf. 
Machar, Riek. "Report and Recommendations of the Chief Mediator of the Peace Process 
Between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance 
Army." Last modified June 16, 2008. Accessed November 30, 2013. 
http://www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/peace_agreements/Machar_Report_1.pdf. 
Nouwen, Sarah M. H.  and Wouter G.  Werner.  2010.  “Doing Justice to the Political:  
The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan. ” The European Journal 
of International Law 21. 4 (2010): 941-965.  
 
Nouwen, Sarah M. H. .  2012.  “The International Criminal Court: A Peacebuilder in  
 Sturkey 44 
 
Africa?” In Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa.  eds.  Devon Curtis and 
Gwinyayi A.  Dzinesa.  Athens: Ohio University Press, 171-192.  
 
Poblicks, Caesar and Kennedy Tumutegyereize.  Personal Interview.  2 July 2012.   
Conciliation Resources, London, UK.  
 
ii
Prorok, Alyssa K. 2013. “The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International  
Criminal Court and Civil Conflict Termination.” Presentation, Peace  
Science Society Conference, October 25, 2013. 
 
Prorok, Alyssa K. 2014. “Variable List.”  Emailed on 19 January 2014. 
 
RadioDabanga, "Signing of Doha Agreement prompts mixed reactions." Accessed  
November 2013. https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/16328. 
 
Schabas, William A. 2011. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. Fourth 
 Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Scharf, Michael.  1999.  “The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court.” Cornell International Law Journal 32 (3): 507-535.   
Simmons, Beth A. and Allison Danner.  2010.  “Credible Commitments and the 
International Criminal Court.”  International Organization 64 (02): 225-256.   
iiiThemner, Lotta. 2013. “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook.” Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program. Center for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). Version 4-2013. 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/167/167198_codebook_ucdp_prio-armed-
conflict-dataset-v4_2013.pdf 
UNAMID, “Doha Document For Peace in Darfur.” Accessed October 23, 2013. 
http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11060 
Walter, Barbara F.  2009.  “Bargaining Failures and Civil War.”  Annual Review of 
Political Science 12: 243-261. 
                                                          
i
 Citation for data (only codebook was used): Cunningham, David E.; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, & Idean 
Salehyan. 2009. "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome", Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 53 (4): 570-597. 
ii
 Because Prorok has not yet published her data, this was the citation used for her data (when it was 
presented) 
iii
 Citation for data (only codebook was used): Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, 
Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of 
Peace Research 39(5). 
